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Abstract 
 
Trade unions provide a voice in the way firms are run, an input into reward systems and 
increased security of employment. But these vary with national context. Using trans-
national survey evidence, we explore the relative impact of setting, and of unions and 
collective bargaining, on these issues. We find that, irrespective of context organisations are 
significantly more likely to make usage of compulsory redundancies in the absence of unions 
and collective bargaining. However, in other areas, the impact of unions appeared less 
pronounced than that of the wider context.  We explore the reasons behind this, and the 
broader policy implications thereof. 
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Institutions, unionisation and voice: The relative impact of context 
and actors on firm level practice 
 
A key question in industrial relations concerns the comparative effect of unionisation and 
setting on employee voice. There is a long tradition in industrial relations research linking 
the presence or absence of trade unions and collective bargaining with elements of voice 
(see, for example, Haynes, Boxall and Macky, 2005; Gollan, 2000) and with security of 
teŶuƌe ;Gall, ϮϬϬϯďͿ. KellǇ ;ϭϵϵϴ: ϰͿ aƌgues that, ǁhilst ǁoƌkeƌs͛ ƌights uŶdeƌ the laǁ aƌe 
important, and vary from context to context, mobilisation capabilities (the ability to attract 
members, to obtain collective representation and to bargain collectively) are also relevant.  
Much of the literature on industrial relations has focused on the consequences of variations 
in the capabilities of individual unions, and the relative utility of specific strategic choices 
(Kelly, 1998; Gall, 2003a). This would suggest, first, that there is much diversity within 
specific national settings and, second, that there is likely to be a close relationship between 
the presence or absence of a union within an individual firm, and the other features of the 
latteƌ͛s ǁoƌk aŶd eŵploǇŵeŶt ƌelatioŶs ;see DuŶdoŶ aŶd ‘olliŶsoŶ, ϮϬϬϰ: ϱ-6).  Much of the 
literature on HRM too has focused on the distinctions between, on the one hand, those 
firms that retain traditional pluralistic employment relations paradigms encompassing union 
recognition and, on the other, those that have moved towards neo-unitarist policies or 
simply retained traditional unitarism (Dundon and Rollinson, 2004; Guest, 1987).  This would 
suggest that, even if there are general tendencies towards the deregulation of labour 
markets, and more broadly speaking, the adoption of liberal market reforms, the strategic 
choices within individual firms remain important (Guest, 1987; c.f. Taras, 2006). 
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By contrast, the contemporary institutional literature argues that the state of collective 
organisation at individual workplaces matters less than wider systemic features in the 
national economic system (Hall and Soskice, 2001: 30).  Whilst this literature suggests that 
unions are likely to be stronger in some settings than others, this reflects the product of 
structural features and, hence, it accords rather less attention to differences in workplace 
level organisation and capabilities for collective mobilisation and action.  In practical terms, 
the central issue is whether the relative position of workers within individual firms is 
primarily a product of setting, or is contingent on organisational capabilities at individual 
workplaces.   
 
From within the broad institutional tradition, a number of accounts have linked embedded 
contextual features to specific areas of practice (Dore, 2000; Hall and Gingrich, 2004; Hall 
and Soskice, 2001; Lane and Wood, 2009).  Much of this literature is based on fairly 
generalized assumptions as to what a representative firm in a particular setting does.  
However, to date, a limitation of much of the existing literature has been that predictions as 
to the relationship between institutions and practice have been founded on stylized ideal 
types, broad analyses of macro-economic trends, and/or limited numbers of case studies, 
rather than on systematic survey evidence as to actual firm level practice (see Dore, 2008).  
This paper seeks to deepen the empirical base of existing comparative frameworks, and to 
provide more nuanced insights into the nature of internal diversity within national 
institutional settings.  We take as our touchstone the recognition or not of trade unions for 
collective bargaining and the presence or not of works councils or consultative committees.  
So our key research questions are: does the setting make a difference to employee voice 
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aŶd the doǁŶstƌeaŵ H‘M pƌaĐtiĐes? Is that diffeƌeŶĐe iƌƌespeĐtiǀe of uŶioŶ ŵoďilisatioŶ − 
does unionisation, as opposed to non-unionism, impact employee voice and security of 
tenure?  Does it make a lot of difference whether a union is recognised or not and, 
particularly, does it matter more in some settings rather than others?  
 
Differing Conceptualisations of Institutional Mediation 
There has been an increasing interest in the effects of institutional configurations on what 
firms do in different settings.  Yet conceptualisations as to how institutions work vary 
greatly.  A key distinction is between those approaches rooted in rational choice economics 
that see institutions as providers of incentives and the socio-economic approaches that see 
them as centres of webs of relations (Lane and Wood, 2009).  The former focus on a single 
institutional feature that over-rides all others (Boyer, 2006), more specifically  the 
institutional foundations of property rights, as providing incentives for rational actors 
(Botero Djankov, La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes, 2004; Goergen, Brewster and Wood, 2009).   
 
In practice, it is held that systems where property rights are the strongest are likely to 
provide the optimal incentives for investors (North, 1990).  As strong investor rights are 
necessary to ensure capital markets are developed, it follows that anything that has the 
potential to detract from them is ultimately undesirable.   This literature argues that owner 
and worker rights represent a zero-sum game; should one be stronger, then the other must 
necessarily be weaker (Botero et al., 2004; Goergen et al., 2009). However, when owners 
are more able to enforce their rights, firms will perform better, with trickle down benefits to 
all, even if at the costs of representation and accountability.  In high property rights 
contexts, countervailing worker power will be weaker.   
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Conversely, in situations where the rights of shareholders are most diluted, and stakeholder 
power relatively strong, formal structures for worker representation are most likely to be 
advanced (Dore 2000).  Mixed systems are likely to face pressures to move towards one or 
other framework, ultimately more likely to be the high property rights option on account of 
its greater efficiencies (see Botero et al., 2004; North, 1990)
i[i]
.   Such approaches deny the 
possibility of complementarity, whereby institutional arrangements make compromises 
possible that are beneficial to employers and workers alike. In contrast, heterodox or socio-
economic approaches to institutions see them as centres of networks of relationships. These 
networks serve as socialising agencies and condition the strategic interactions of various 
agents, in addition to conferring power on particular actors and, indeed, performing the 
above-mentioned role of providing incentives and disincentives to rational actors (Hall and 
Soskice 2001: 5).  Embedded property rights are not necessarily more important than any 
set of social relations.  Much of the literature on comparative capitalisms draws a central 
distinction between liberal market economies (LMEs) where shareholder rights are most 
advanced and co-ordinated market economies (CMEs) where they are less so (Hall and 
Soskice, 2001; Dore, 2000).  In these approaches there is no inherent reason why one 
system should necessarily perform better than the other (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Hall and 
Gingrich, 2004).  Implicit in this work is a defence of social democratic and other forms of 
non-liberal market capitalism.   
 
In CMEs, it is held that relatively advanced forms of employee representation in the 
workplace may dilute owner/shareholder power, but that this is more than offset by greater 
employee commitment to the firm (Hall and Soskice 2001; Dore 2000).  Stronger employee 
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voice not only means that employee concerns and grievances are taken more seriously, but 
also that the knowledge employees hold on the process of production is more effectively 
harnessed (Gollan, 2009).  Institutional arrangements within CMEs help maintain high levels 
of industry relevant skills that are beneficial both economically and socially (see Culpepper, 
2001; Goergen, Brewster, Wood and Wilkinson, 2012).  And, whilst owners may face a 
dilution of power at the point of production, this is offset by specific opportunities to 
advance their interests outside of the workplace (Morin, 2005): inter alia, through more 
effective employers associations, through neo-corporatist deal making and through more 
long term relationships with customers and suppliers.      
 
In LMEs, there is a far greater emphasis on adversarial competition, weaker employee 
rights, short term contracting and more fluid labour markets (Hall and Soskice, 2001).  
However, even in such contexts, labour skills formation matters a great deal.  Relatively 
large numbers of highly mobile graduates with generic skills are conducive to high 
technology industries, whilst in more traditional manufacturing industries persistent 
collective arrangements at firm level may continue to promote human capital development 
(Estevez-Abe et al., 2001: 163). 
 
There have been numerous developments, extensions and critiques of the Hall and Soskice 
(2001) approach (c.f. Hancke et al., 2007; Lane and Wood, 2009).  Firstly, underlying the 
dichotomous approach was the assumption that only the LME and CME models had known 
complementarities and that other models would inevitably converge with one or the other 
(Hall and Soskice, 2001: 18-19).  Since then there has been growing recognition not only that 
other types of capitalism may continue to develop on distinct lines but without the 
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developed complementarities associated with the mature capitalist archetypes (Hancke, 
2007).  This would include the linkages between the formal regulation of labour markets and 
the nature of employee representation within the workplace. In less developed archetypes, 
such as mixed market economies (MMEs, the Mediterranean world) and emerging market 
economies (EMEs, the ex-communist states of central and eastern Europe), not only are 
different aspects of legislation and practice not nearly so closely aligned, but also 
enforcement of labour law is much weaker (Hancke et al., 2007; Psychogios and Wood, 
2010).  In short, one is less likely to encounter a close association between wider social 
context, and between one form of employee representation (such as collective bargaining) 
and another.     
 
Secondly, the approach assumes that institutional features are closely enmeshed, together 
creating complementarities in a manner that would not be possible if they were 
encountered alone (Hall and Soskice, 2001: 18).  Hence, it would be unlikely that any specific 
firm level practice would be the sole product of a single institutional feature.  Subsequent 
chapters in the Hall and Soskice volume are by no means so confident in terms of country 
categorisations, the durability of specific national models, and the relative closeness of 
institutional coupling.  For example, Hancke (2001: 307) argues that the old French system 
has been depleted, and has been replaced by a new model that is more under the sway of 
Anglo-Saxon influences.  Culpepper (2001: 275) argues that even when countries lack the 
overall institutional framework encountered in CMEs, there is room for policy initiatives that 
create coordination in specific policy areas.  In practice, parties may cooperate on a 
decentralized level on regional and/or sectoral lines ( Culpepper, 2001: 288). 
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Although they differ on the relative desirability of worker rights, both the legal origin and 
varieties of capitalism approaches suggest that employee voice will be stronger in 
CMEs/stakeholder orientated systems; even if a union is not present, there are likely to be 
other mechanisms, such as legally mandated works councils or voluntary joint consultative 
committees, through which employees mediate owner power.  Hence, the literature on 
comparative capitalisms (Deeg and Jackson, 2008) and, indeed, the rational-hierarchical 
accounts associated with the economics and finance literature, implicitly or explicitly 
suggest that shareholder dominant liberal market economies (LMEs) are associated not only 
with weaker collective voice, but also a reduced emphasis on employee input into key issues 
such as employment security.  In other words, the argument is that the nature and extent of 
voice are systemically driven, through both embedded formal rules or conventions and 
informal ones.  In practice, there are of course many firms in LMEs that adopt broadly 
cooperative practices and many within CMEs that are unitarist.  This raises a question as to 
whether firms departing from the norm are challenging the system through pioneering new 
sets of practices, are a historical residue from a previous institutional order, or are broadly 
adhering to a specific model even if they depart from certain systemic features (Dore, 2008).  
   
Regulation of the Employment Contract 
The employment contract is an uncertain exchange between employers and workers: a 
readily quantifiable wage is exchanged for an uncertain amount of labour power (Hyman, 
1975).  From an employer point of view, key concerns include maximizing the quantity or 
quality of output for the wage accorded (Deckop et al., 1999).  From a worker point of view, 
a key concern is the relative ability to impart predictability into the employment 
relationship, regulating the exercise of managerial power (Bryson et al., 2006; Kelly, 1998). 
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There is a very broad body of literature on the role of trade unions that suggests that one of 
their primary functions is rule making, formalizing the boundaries of managerial authority, 
and institutionalizing the process of bargaining between employers and employees 
(Marsden, 1999: 110-111).  Employee voice is central to this function but the form of voice 
matters.  Collective bargaining is one possible forum and so are works councils or joint 
consultative committees.  These represent, in many different settings, an important forum 
for negotiating changes to the social organisation of work.  Indeed, it can be argued that, as 
they are collective and representative bodies, they are intrinsically a more effective 
mechanism for representing worker concerns than individual or direct forms of worker 
iŶǀolǀeŵeŶt ;DuŶdoŶ, ϮϬϬϮͿ ǁhiĐh ŵaǇ Ŷot oŶlǇ ďe little ŵoƌe thaŶ ͞a ďƌokeŶ telephoŶe͟, 
but may serve to hamper future organisational initiatives (Kaufman and Taras, 2000: 10-11; 
Terry, 1999; see also Gollan, 2005, 2006).  Indeed, voice may even be used as a means of 
ĐaptuƌiŶg ǁoƌkeƌs͛ iŶsideƌ kŶoǁledge so that theǇ ĐaŶ ďe ŵoƌe ƌeadilǇ dispeŶsed ǁith 
(Terry, 1999).  Where unions are not recognised for collective bargaining, it could be argued 
that the ͚pull͛ of ŶatioŶal iŶstitutioŶs ŵaǇ ďe ǁeakeƌ, eŶfoƌĐeŵeŶt of the letteƌ aŶd spiƌit of 
the law less effective and national level social compromises more likely to be contested (see 
Boyer, 2010).  
 
Within firms where the unions are not recognised, Kaufman (2004) argues that managers 
will seek to confine employee voice narrowly for fear that it will develop towards collective 
voice; in unionised firms, this has already occurred.  In many CMEs, employers of a certain 
size are obliged to have works councils, and pan-European firms of a certain size, European 
Works Councils.  The latter vary in their relative strength from context to context, ranging 
from German-type works councils where co-determinative rights are entrenched by law, to 
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relatively weak European Works Councils that, at the bare minimum, may be primarily 
consultative bodies (Ramsay, 2003).  Nonetheless, research reveals that firms which had 
works councils in place – regardless of whether they were weak or strong – appeared to be 
more likely to recognise unions than those where these were absent (Brewster et al., 
2007b).  In other words, works councils and joint consultative committees (JCCs) appear to 
have a general impact on employment relations policies that appears to transcend their 
formal role under the law.  Hence, it could be argued that the presence or absence of a JCC 
or works council represents an important indicator of the countervailing power of workers 
(Rogers and Streeck, 1995).  
 
A key concern is employment secuƌitǇ.  It has ďeeŶ Ŷoted that ͞joďs aƌe alǁaǇs at the ŵeƌĐǇ 
of eĐoŶoŵiĐ aŶd teĐhŶologiĐal ǀagaƌies͟ ;HǇŵaŶ, ϮϬϬϮ: ϱϳͿ.  This ǁould suggest that a keǇ 
feature of relative worker power – whether representing a product of systemic features or 
workplace level organisational capabilities – is the extent to which workers are able to 
constrain the usage of redundancies and outsourcing.  Whilst technological or external 
economic shocks may cost jobs, there are a range of softer mechanisms firms have at their 
disposal, such as redeployments, early retirement policies, or hiring freezes (see Wilkinson, 
2005).  Unionisation or non-unionisation may impact upon managers choices.  
 
Employee Representation in Non-Union Firms: Existing Research 
Budd, Gollan and Wilkinson (2009: 2) note that voice may either be collective and 
representative or individual and direct.  The former includes forms such as collective 
bargaining, works councils and joint consultative committees.  The latter encompasses 
informal interactions between employer and employees, and more formal structures for 
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involvement, such as managerial briefings, suggestion schemes or quality circles (Brewster, 
Wood, Croucher and Brookes 2007a; Budd et al., 2009: 2).  In non-union and weak union 
environments informal interchanges may assume a particular importance.  However, what 
sets formal non-union voice mechanisms apart is that they only involve employees within 
the enterprise, with little or no external involvement or resources from unions, whilst they 
operate on company resources (Gollan, 2009: 213; Taras and Kaufman, 2006).  Whilst 
recognizing the importance of informal interactions, this article concentrates on 
involvement and participation through formalised processes and procedures.  
 
Where unions are strongest, and where they have gained recognition for collective 
bargaining, evidence of their countervailing power on firm practices will be most 
pronounced (Cooke, 1994; Bryson et al., 2006).  In turn, it can be argued that this would 
make for much diversity within national settings, in line with sectoral and regional variations 
in union traditions, and the real strategic choices made by leaderships (Gall, 2003a).  Indeed, 
Bechter Brandl and Meardi, (2012) found that there was as much variation in industrial 
relations practice within European countries as between them.  Hence, we explore sectoral 
differences. 
 
Key Issues 
From this account it follows that we are primarily interested in three issues. The first of 
these concerns setting and its impact on employee voice mechanisms and whether unions 
have collective bargaining rights at the workplace either by law (in some national contexts – 
mostly CMEs – works councils are compulsory under the law) and/or through collective 
strength.  It has been argued that there is a clear relationship between unionisation and 
13 
 
collective bargaining on the one hand and the presence or absence of a works council or JCC 
on the other hand.  Gollan (2009: 212) argues that non-uŶioŶ ĐolleĐtiǀe ǀoiĐe ͞has teŶded to 
play a minimal role in many Anglo industrial relations systems, with few formal processes or 
legal ƌeƋuiƌeŵeŶts͟.  Bƌeǁsteƌ et al. ;ϮϬϬϳa) found that the presence of a union is 
correlated with the existence of works councils and JCCs.  Are these collective forms of 
representation likely to coincide with the presence or absence of a union, and/or are these 
primarily a product of setting?  
 
Implicit in all institutional accounts is an assumption that setting is likely to mould practice.  
This may involve either a division of mature capitalisms into LMEs and CMEs (with possible 
other archetypes encompassing less developed emerging or mixed economies) or the 
allocation of countries to a scale according to the relative strength of owner and 
countervailing employee rights (see also Bosch, Rubery and Lehndorff, 2007): 
 
Hypothesis 1a: firms in CMEs are more likely to have collective representational 
voice than firms in other capitalist archetypes 
Hypothesis 1b: firms from settings with stronger shareholder rights are less likely 
to have collective representational rights than firms from countries with weaker 
shareholder rights     
 
The first hypothesis may seem an obvious one, and one that is easily provable, but it 
provides a foundation for subsequent hypotheses.  The subsequent hypotheses centre on 
the extent to which trade unions impact on key issues for workers within the firm.   
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Further, there is the issue of security of tenure and the relative willingness to deploy 
͞haƌdeƌ͟ foƌŵs of adjustiŶg ǁoƌkfoƌĐe sizes, suĐh as ƌeduŶdaŶĐies aŶd outsouƌĐiŶg 
(Wilkinson, 2005).  Trade unions aim, perhaps above all, to protect the security of their 
members (see Gall, 2003a, 2003b).  Security has many components but a significant one is 
the iŶdiǀidual͛s aďilitǇ to ƌesist ďeiŶg ŵade ƌeduŶdaŶt agaiŶst theiƌ ǁill – compulsory 
redundancy.  It seems likely that unions will strive to avoid compulsory redundancies or 
redeployments wherever possible (Gall, 2003b: 87).  They might also be expected to oppose 
outsourcing of work and jobs.  In both cases, where the management of the firm is able to 
convince the unions that labour costs need to be cut drastically, they will generally prefer 
͞softeƌ͟ optioŶs suĐh as ǀoluŶtaƌǇ ƌeduŶdaŶĐǇ. 
 
Hypothesis 2a: where collective representation is strongest, the use of compulsory 
redundancies will be lower, irrespective of setting 
 
Hypothesis 2b: where collective representation is strongest, the use of outsourcing 
will be lower, irrespective of setting 
 
Method 
This data analysis is based on the Cranet survey, 2004/05. This wave covers a total of 32 
countries from Western Europe, North America, Eastern Europe as well as transitional 
economies (see Table 1 for the list of countries).  The survey covers all sectors within the 
countries surveyed, only excluding smaller firms (those with less than 100 employees), and 
probes HRM policies and practices in private and public organisation.  However, in this study 
we focus on theformer.  The survey primarily concentrates on factual information, rather 
15 
 
than subjective opinions and, hence, uses mostly closed-ended questions.  Full details on 
survey methodology are provided by Brewster, Mayrhofer and Morley (2004).  Given their 
importance in explaining differences in industrial relations (Doellgast, Holtgrewe and Deery, 
2009; Ferrer and Lluis, 2009), we checked not just for country and variety of capitalism but 
also for differences related to size and sector. In what follows, non-union firms are defined 
as those that do not recognise a union for collective bargaining.    
 
We acknowledge that the exclusion of small firms constitutes a limitation of this research, 
especially given that they are generally exempt from compulsory works council legislation in 
force in many CMEs.  The work and employment relations policies in smaller firms in CMEs 
that lack the restraining presence of a works council are likely to be very different (c.f. Lane 
and Wood, 2009).  Furthermore, union presence is largely a function of firm size: the vast 
majority of small firms have no union representation.  What we do here is to compare 
unionised and non-unionised medium-sized and larger firms so that we are, as far as 
possible, comparing like with like.  
 
<<Table 1 about here>> 
 
Recognising unions for collective bargaining refers to responses to the survey question 
askiŶg fiƌŵs if theǇ ͞ƌeĐogŶize a uŶioŶ͟ ;at oƌgaŶisatioŶal leǀelͿ foƌ the puƌpose of ĐolleĐtiǀe 
bargaining.  This is not necessarily the same thing as being engaged in collective bargaining 
at national/regional/firm levels.  It is possible that a firm may be bound by national or 
regional collective bargaining agreements (and, indeed, in rare cases be represented at the 
collective bargaining table via the relevant employer association), yet have a union presence 
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in their own organisation that falls below de factor or de jure criteria for recognition.  We 
acknowledge that a scrutiny of variations in industry and national collective bargaining 
coverage might yield somewhat different results that might be even more closely bound up 
with national institutional setting. 
 
On average, and unsurprisingly given the European focus and the exclusion of very small 
organisations, only 28% of the sample firms fall into the non-union category.  
 
 
Findings 
Given that we look at the absence or presence of both union recognition and non-union 
voice, i.e. the presence of a works council or JCC, we have four different categories of firms 
(see Table 2).  
 
Firms that both recognise unions for collective bargaining and have a works council (or JCC) 
are the most frequent, constituting roughly 44% of the sample.  Firms with neither are the 
second most common occurrence, and amount to 20% of the sample, followed by firms that 
recognise a trade union, but do not have a works council (17% of the firms).  Finally, less 
than 8% of firms surveyed did not recognise a trade union, but still had a works council or 
JCC in place; in other words, there was a strong linkage between union recognition and the 
presence of a works council or JCC.   
 
<<Table 2 about here>> 
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Setting, Works Councils/JCCs and Collective Bargaining 
Table 3 and Table 4 test the validity of Hypothesis 1a and Hypothesis 1b, respectively.  Table 
3 distinguishes between firms from CMEs, LMEs, EMEs, MMEs and other countries.  The 
LMEs in our sample are Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK and the USA.  CMEs covered 
here are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Slovenia, Sweden and Switzerland.  EMEs include Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary and Slovakia.  MMEs cover Cyprus, Greece, Israel, Italy and Spain.  All 
ƌeŵaiŶiŶg ĐouŶtƌies fall uŶdeƌ the ͞otheƌ͟ ĐategoƌǇ; eŵeƌgiŶg ŵaƌkets ǁheƌe institutional 
arrangements are even more fluid and uneven in coverage.  Israel is different from other 
MMEs in terms of issues such as the relative role of the security sector, the role of the state 
in agricultural policy, and immigration policy.  Hence, we checked whether the link between 
capitalism and non-union voice was affected by this different categorisation of Israel.
ii[ii]
  
 
Each column of Panel A of Table 3 reports the percentage of firms from each of the five 
varieties of capitalism for each of the four categories of firms.  The table shows that firms 
from LMEs are more likely to have neither collective bargaining nor works councils; the 
latter may be partially a function of the law, given that in some CMEs it is compulsory for 
firms above a specific size to have a works council.  What is apparent is that CMEs in this 
respect are very different to less mature capitalist archetypes.  Indeed, both union and 
formal non-union voice – independent of the existence of collective bargaining – are 
strongest in firms from CMEs, again, a feature distinct from all the other archetypes.  This 
supports Hypothesis 1a.  Panel B of Table 3 reports that there are statistically significant 
differences in these percentages.  In detail, firms from CMEs are more heavily present 
among the category of firms with both collective bargaining and works councils compared 
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to all other varieties of capitalism.  Irrespective of whether firms were unionised or not, 
works councils/JCCs were less common in liberal market economies: it appears the latter are 
less an expression of union power, or managerial attempts at union substitution, than 
simply of context (see Rogers and Streeck, 1995).   
 
As mentioned above, a case can be made for categorising Israel among the ͚other͛ variety of 
capitalism rather than as an MME, with some similarities to the Mediterranean world.  In 
this case, the percentages in Panel A of Table 3 do not change qualitatively.  However, there 
are some changes in Panel B with respect to the differences in percentages.  These 
differences all relate to the MME column. In detail, there is no longer a significant difference 
ďetǁeeŶ MMEs aŶd the ͚other͛ variety of capitalism with respect to the percentage of 
organisations with no collective bargaining, but a works council.  There is also no longer a 
significant difference between MMEs and LMEs with respect to the percentage of 
organisations with collective bargaining, but no works council.  Finally, there is now a 
significant difference between the MMEs and the ͚other͛ variety in terms of the percentage 
of firms with both collective bargaining and non-union voice.  
 
<<Table 3 about here>> 
 
Table 4 is based on the Djankov et al. (2008) anti-self-dealing index.  The index measures the 
level of protection enjoyed by minority shareholders.  According to Djankov et al., this index 
has a stronger theoretical basis than the La Porta et al. (1997b, 1998) anti-directors-rights 
indeǆ ǁhiĐh ǁas ĐoŶstƌuĐted iŶ a faiƌlǇ ͚ad hoĐ͛ ǁaǇ.  The aŶti-self-dealing index looks at 
transactions of corporate self-dealing, i.e. self-dealing by the controlling shareholder, and 
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then counts the number of hurdles that the controlling shareholder will have to jump to 
engage in these transactions.  Panel A of Table 4 suggests that there is an inverse 
relationship between investor rights as measured by the anti-self-dealing index and the 
union and non-union voice of employees.  Firms with both collective bargaining and a works 
council are on average from countries with weaker investor rights whereas firms with 
neither are from countries with the strongest investor rights, as predicted by Botero et al. 
(2004).  Panel B suggests that these differences in the investor protection index are not just 
of economic significance, but also of statistical significance.  This supports Hypothesis 1b.  
There is no significant difference between firms without any voice (whether union or non-
union) and those with a works council/JCC only, perhaps indicating that without union 
backing works councils/JCCs are not seen as a threat to employers. 
 
<<Table 4 about here>> 
 
Setting and Security of Tenure 
Showing that worker voice is more common in economies closest to the CME ideal is a first 
step.  The next question is whether this makes a difference.  What effect do unions have on 
key areas of work and employment relations?   Or, is context more important than a union 
presence in determining the human resource management of firms?  We explored the 
association between unionisation and the critical issue of security of tenure (Table 5).   
 
<<Table 5 about here>> 
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Panel A of Table 5 reports the proportion of firms for each category using different types of 
HRM policy and Panel B reports the tests for the differences in proportions.  We examine 
job security.  We look at the use of voluntary and compulsory redundancies as well as the 
use of outsourcing to reduce the workforce.  
 
In line with our Hypotheses 2a and 2b, there are significant differences between the four 
categories of firms in their usage of harder forms of numerical flexibility
iii[iii]
.  In detail, Panels 
A and B of Table 5 suggest that the use of voluntary redundancies is significantly lower in 
firms with neither works councils nor collective bargaining when compared to all other 
categories of firms.  While there are no statistical differences in the use of voluntary 
redundancies among the other three categories, there is nevertheless an economic 
difference: 76% of firms with both collective bargaining and works councils use voluntary 
redundancies compared to only 71-72% for firms with either a works council or collective 
bargaining.  From the opposite perspective, the percentage of firms using compulsory 
redundancies is significantly lower for the category of firms with both collective bargaining 
and works councils compared to all the other categories.  Hence, there is evidence that if a 
decrease of the workforce is called for this is more likely to be done by softer policies (i.e. 
voluntary redundancies) rather than harder policies (i.e. compulsory redundancies) in firms 
with collective bargaining and works councils. 
 
This is likely to reflect the fact that, in order to offset any union wage premium, firms may 
either already make use of very lean staffing and/or heavily invest in the skills and 
capabilities of such workers to enhance their effectiveness, making compulsory 
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redundancies, in turn, less defensible.  It could also reflect the effectiveness of collective 
organisation in protecting the interests of members (Gall, 2003b).   
 
We also examine the use of outsourcing to reduce the workforce. The use of outsourcing is 
lowest in firms with neither collective bargaining nor non-union voice compared to firms 
with a works council and those with both a works council and collective bargaining and this 
difference is significant.  However, there is no difference in the case of firms with only 
collective bargaining.  Why is this?  In many European countries, works councils are 
compulsory in firms above a certain size which, in turn, may be more likely to engage in 
outsourcing (simply because there are more opportunities for outsourcing).  This does 
reveal that unions have not been very effective in braking outsourcing activities, particularly 
if outsourcing and an associated transfer of staff to the chosen provider are presented as 
the only alternative to immediate job losses.  Conversely, it means that workers in non-
union firms are no more likely to have to contend with outsourcing. 
 
Effects of Sector and Firm Size 
 
We carried out several tests on size and sector differences (tables available from the 
authors). We found, using the European NACE categorisation, that there is evidence of 
differences between industries: some
iv[iv]
 had higher percentages of firms with no voice and 
some
v[v]
 had significantly higher percentages of firms with both collective bargaining and 
works councils, in line with the findings of Bechter et al. (2012).  We also found that the 
relative size of the firm was related to whether or not firms recognized unions or had works 
councils; the larger the firm, the more likely this was the case.  
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Theoretical Implications 
 
Our findings confirm the impact of institutional context on union recognition
vi[vi]
.  On the 
one hand, this corresponds with the broad categorizations of Hall and Soskice (2001).  On 
the other hand, a closer scrutiny revealed that a single institutional feature on its own – 
relative shareholder rights according to the anti-self-dealing index of Botero et al. (2004) – 
had a direct impact.  Does that mean the more complex social relationship orientated view 
of Hall and Soskice (2001) that encompasses many institutional features is essentially 
incorrect and that really only one institutional feature matters, and that there is little point 
in concerning oneself with other institutional features at all?  There are two reasons why 
this is not the case.  In looking at other dimensions of work and employment relations, for 
example, relative propensity to invest in people – using the same Cranet dataset – other 
research has found that a focus on shareholder rights alone provides a poor explanation 
(Goergen et al., 2012).  In other words, what this study reveals is that in one specific area – 
union recognition – a particular institutional feature has a strong pull.  If shareholder rights 
are stronger, then, as suggested by a wide body of literature from very different starting 
points, it is likely that other stakeholders will lose out (Dore, 2000; Botero et al., 2004).  
However, this does not mean that in CMEs, shareholders may not do better in the long term 
through taking worker and other stakeholder rights (whether by choice or because they are 
compelled to by the law) more seriously even if, in the short term, their freedom of action is 
circumscribed (Dore, 2000).  A fertile area for future research is to explore what other 
institutional features (for example, national education and training systems) may have a 
particularly strong impact on particular dimensions of work and employment practice at 
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firm level.  In other words, rather than taking a broadly composite approach to institutional 
effects (i.e. simply presenting a bundle of institutional features that exert a combined effect 
distinct from their individual impact) or focusing only on a single dimension (i.e. shareholder 
rights), a possible future research dimension might be to develop a comprehensive 
taxonomy of differing institutional dimensions, exploring which of the latter impacts on 
which firm practice.   
 
Existing research, for example in some of the chapters in the 2001 Hall and Soskice volume 
and follow up volumes edited by Hancke, already highlights the specific impact of particular 
institutional domains, for example, training (Culpepper, 2001) and labour market regulation 
(Taylor, 2007: 244) on key dimensions of organisational practice.  Amable (2003) provides a 
useful starting point in identifying a range of interlinked institutional features, which, 
however, each exert their own effects in particular areas; however, this study provides little 
in the way of firm level data, concentrating more on broad labour market and sectoral 
features according to context.   
 
Again, whilst dichotomous approaches to categorizing capitalisms work quite well here, this 
is, once more, not true for other features of work and employment relations practice.  
Goergen et al. (2012) found that when it came to training and development, there were 
pronounced differences between Nordic social democratic capitalism and continental 
European coordinated markets, as suggested by Amable (2003).  This would not only further 
highlight the extent to which some institutional dimensions exert a stronger impact on 
specific firm practices than others, but also that some broad features may be shared across 
CMEs (and, by implication, LMEs as well) and others not.  In categorizing capitalisms, there is 
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always a trade off between parsimony and nuance; what this study indicates is that 
dichotomous approaches have clear validity in some areas of work and employment 
practices, even if, as Whitley (1999) and Amable (2003) suggest, in others they do not.    
 
We found that MMEs and EMEs, as predicted by Hancke et al. (2007), had characteristics 
somewhere between the LME and CME poles.  However, MMEs were somewhat closer to 
the CME end of the spectrum when it came to unionisation and to some extent non union 
representative voice mechanisms.  However, the survey excludes small enterprises; as 
Psychogios and Wood (2010) note, unions and collective representation continue to play a 
prominent role within larger organizations in MME states. In contrast, representation and 
collective rights are very much weaker in the very large SME sectors and the also important 
underground economies, areas not covered by the survey.  Hence, it cannot be concluded 
that MME firms are generally closer to the CME model than those encountered in other 
types of capitalism, but larger ones are.   However, it is likely that the differences between 
these archetypes will increase as radical austerity is enforced across the MME world.  EMEs, 
meanwhile, were revealed to be a very diverse category from the LME like Estonia to 
countries such as Hungary and the Czech Republic, where levels of collective representation 
were higher.  Indeed, it could be argued that the EME category is so disparate as to not 
constitute a meaningful archetype at all, reflecting the uneven and contested nature of 
change in the region. 
 
Finally, and bound up with the above points, there are some features of work and 
employment practice – more specifically, relative propensity to make redundancies – that 
appear to be closely associated with another practice – union recognition, but less so with 
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institutional setting.  Why would this be the case, particularly as existing work suggests that 
the security of tenure represents a core distinction between different capitalist archetypes 
(Whitley, 1999; Hall and Soskice, 2001)?  Gourevitch and Shinn (2007) argue that an 
important dimension of firm level governance is politics and shifts in political dynamics.  
Although it can be argued that the differences between established political parties have 
eroded in many national contexts, right wing parties maybe quite aggressive in promoting 
shareholder rights over those of other stakeholders, and left wing ones somewhat more 
cautious.  Indeed, there is an extensive body of literature that argues that right wing parties 
are more associated with higher unemployment and job shedding (Palmer and Whitten, 
2000; Alt, 1985).  This would highlight the limitations of seeing institutions as somehow 
immutable, and the extent to which they may be constantly remoulded – on both 
incremental and radical lines – through the activities of social actors (Boyer, 2006; Lane and 
Wood, 2009).  Although the challenging of existing norms may take place at a wide range of 
levels (Dore, 2008), the national political level is of particular importance (Gourevitch and 
Shinn, 2007).  Again, a closer evaluation of the impact of ruling party ideology on firm level 
approaches to numerical flexibility would represent an important future research direction 
that, however, goes beyond the scope of this paper.       
 
Conclusions 
This paper provides clear empirical evidence that variety of capitalism makes a significant 
and persistent difference to the likelihood of finding firms that are unionised and that have 
formal representative voice mechanisms.  Equally, firms from countries that have stronger 
shareholder as opposed to stakeholder rights are less likely to deal with trade unions and to 
have formal collective representation systems.  It is common knowledge, of course, that 
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there is a clear geographical difference in union representation, and this is bound up with 
different institutional traditions.  However, we also found that the presence or absence of a 
union was bound up with the relative proclivity to make use of redundancies.  This raises an 
important issue.  On the one hand, national setting matters in determining whether or not a 
union is present.  On the other hand, irrespective of setting, if a union is present, then it is 
likely to impact on such practices.  In other words, it would be wrong to say that unions are 
somehow and necessarily less effective in some settings than others when it comes to 
protecting the interests of their members in terms of job security.  This raises two important 
policy dimensions.  Firstly, legislative interventions to improve collective rights are likely to 
have positive knock-on effects in promoting more worker friendly HRM policies.  The 
converse is likely to be true when legislation weakens collective rights; this finding is of 
particular relevance given strong pressures on many national governments in Europe to 
promote the individualisation of industrial relations.  Secondly, it seems that, even in more 
hostile settings, unions can and do make a difference.        
 
We found predictable difference was in an area which would unambiguously reflect hard 
line HRM policies (c.f. Redman and Wilkinson 2009): non-union firms were more likely to 
make use of compulsory redundancies.  Although there is little doubt that the relative 
power and impact of unions has diminished within many national settings, it is evident that 
this is one area where unions have retained a significant influence.  Even if unions are 
relatively weak in organisational terms, they may still be able to hold management to 
account in this area, owing to accumulated experience and legal expertise, which may deter 
employers from rushing to make usage of redundancies, and encourage them to take the 
tiŵe to ĐoŶsideƌ ŵeaŶiŶgful alteƌŶatiǀes.  As the pool of ͚good͛ joďs ĐoŶtiŶues to diŵiŶish iŶ 
27 
 
many national contexts, this vests unions with a continued importance even when collective 
mobilizational capabilities have eroded. 
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Table 1: Sample characteristics, union recognition and existence of works council and/or joint consultative committee 
Country 
Number of 
firms 
Percentage of 
sample 
Percentage of firms recognizing unions 
for collective bargaining 
Percentage of firms with works council 
and/or joint consultative committee 
Australia (LME) 191 3.4% 61% 41% 
Austria (CME) 198 3.6% 100% 90% 
Belgium (CME) 201 3.6% 88% 90% 
Bulgaria (EME) 101 1.8% 55% 39% 
Canada (LME) 207 3.7% 53% 38% 
Cyprus (MME) 39 0.7% 79% 31% 
Czech Republic (EME) 62 1.1% 94% 15% 
Denmark (CME) 288 5.2% 77% 71% 
Estonia (EME) 73 1.3% 26% 22% 
Finland (CME) 137 2.5% 84% 87% 
France (CME) 130 2.3% 99% 99% 
Germany (CME) 264 4.8% 100% 92% 
Greece (MME) 148 2.7% 77% 39% 
Hungary (EME) 60 1.1% 87% 68% 
Iceland (CME) 56 1.0% 86% 29% 
Israel (MME) 100 1.8% 56% 25% 
Italy (MME) 80 1.4% 86% 60% 
Nepal (Other) 96 1.7% 72% 19% 
Netherlands (CME) 174 3.1% 81% 89% 
New Zealand (LME) 183 3.3% 62% 27% 
Norway (CME) 94 1.7% 88% 72% 
Philippines (Other) 50 0.9% 74% 56% 
Slovakia (EME) 212 3.8% 48% 40% 
Slovenia (CME) 101 1.8% 50% 71% 
Spain (MME) 139 2.5% 73% 91% 
Sweden (CME) 238 4.3% 100% 89% 
Switzerland (CME) 221 4.0% 79% 41% 
Tunisia (Other) 146 2.6% 100% 95% 
Turkey (Other) 157 2.8% 48% 13% 
Turkish Cypriot Community (Other) 70 1.3% 13% 8% 
UK (LME) 774 14.0% 42% 45% 
USA (LME) 133 2.4% 39% 21% 
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Table 2: Importance of union recognition 
and non-union voice 
 
 Do you recognise unions for 
collective bargaining? 
No Yes 
Do you have a joint 
consultative committee or 
works council? 
No 20.4% 16.8% 
Yes 
7.4% 43.7% 
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Table 3: Capitalisms and non-union voice 
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Panel A: Collective bargaining and works councils across varieties of capitalism 
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 Varietiesof capitalism 
CME LME EME MME Other 
No collective bargaining and 
no works council 
9.3% 41.0% 27.6% 19.2% 34.4% 
No collective bargaining, but 
works council 
5.4% 12.5% 14.9% 8.8% 4.1% 
Collective bargaining, but no 
works council 
14.9% 19.4% 27.6% 26.7% 22.7% 
Collective bargaining and works 
council 
70.4% 27.1% 30.0% 45.3% 38.7% 
 
Panel B: Comparison of percentages 
 
 VOC 
CME LME EME MME Other 
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) 
No collective bargaining and 
no works council 
 A C D A D A A D 
No collective bargaining, but 
works council 
 A E A E A E  
Collective bargaining, but no 
works council 
 A A B A B A 
Collective bargaining and 
works council 
B C D E   B C B 
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Table 4: Property rights and non-union voice 
Panel A: Property rights index (mean) 
 No collective 
bargaining and no 
works council 
No collective 
bargaining, but 
works council 
Collective 
bargaining, but no 
works council 
Collective 
bargaining and 
works council 
La Porta et al. anti-self-
dealing index 
0.67 0.64 0.51 0.42 
Panel B: Comparison of means 
 No collective 
bargaining and no 
works council 
No collective 
bargaining, but 
works council 
Collective 
bargaining, but no 
works council 
Collective 
bargaining and 
works council 
 (A) (B) (C) (D) 
La Porta et al. anti-self-
dealing index 
C D C D D  
Results are based on two-sided tests assuming equal variances with significancelevel 0.05. For each 
significant pair, the key of the smaller category appears under the category with larger mean. Tests are 
adjusted for all pairwise comparisons using the Bonferroni correction. 
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Table 5: Union recognition, non-union voice and HRM practices 
Panel A: Proportions of firms 
 No collective bargaining and 
no works council 
No collective bargaining, 
but works council 
Collective bargaining, but no 
works council 
Collective bargaining and 
works council 
Decrease by voluntary redundancies 00.53 0.71 0.72 .76 
Decrease by compulsory redundancies 0.84 0.86 0.85 0.76 
Decrease by outsourcing 0.33 0.55 0.44 0.50 
Panel B: Comparison of proportions 
 No collective bargaining and 
no works council 
No collective bargaining, 
but works council 
Collective bargaining, but no 
works council 
Collective bargaining and 
works council 
 (A) (B) (C) (D) 
Decrease by voluntary redundancies  A A A 
Decrease by compulsory redundancies D D D  
Decreaseby outsourcing  A  A 
Results are based on two-sided tests assuming equal variances with significance level 0.05. For each significant pair, the key of the smaller category appears under the 
category with larger mean. Tests are adjusted for all pairwise comparisons using the Bonferroni correction. 
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Endnotes 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 [i]
 It should be noted that, whilst coming from a very different starting point, the analytical categories derived 
by Botero et al. in Europe broadly correspond with those of Amable (2003): common law (liberal market 
based), Scandinavian civil law (social democratic), German civil law (continental European capitalism), and 
French civil law (Mediterranean capitalism). A notable exception is the case of France. 
 
 [ii]
 The alternative Table 3 is available upon request from the authors. 
 
 [iii]
 These percentages are conditional percentages, i.e. they are based on the subsample of firms that have 
decreased their workforce. In detail, the releǀaŶt ƋuestioŶ iŶ the CƌaŶet ƋuestioŶŶaiƌe is as folloǁs: ͞If the 
number of employees has decreased, have any of the following methods been used to reduce the number of 
people eŵploǇed?͟ 
 
 [iv]
 These sectors include: Agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing; Building and civil engineering; Retail and 
distribution, hotels, catering, repairs; Baking, finance, insurance, business services; Personal, domestic, 
recreational services; Other services; Education; Public administration; and Other. 
 
 [v]
 These sectors are: Energy and Water; Chemical products, extraction and processing of non-energy minerals; 
Metal manufacturing, mechanical, electrical and instrument engineering, office and data processing 
machinery; Transport and communication; and Health services. 
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 [vi]
 This was certainly the case when the data was collected. There is evidence that basic aspects of human 
resource management and industrial relations change only slowly (Mayrhofer, W., Brewster, C., Morley,M. and 
Ledolter, J. (2011) Hearing a Different drummer? Evidence of convergence in European HRM Human Resource 
Management Review 21 (1): 50-67) and it seems unlikely that many of the areas under consideration here 
(union recognition, works councils, etc) would be either affected by the economic crisis in the short term or 
operate differentially between the various categories we explore. 
 
